Beijing must evaluate its interests in Latin America.
The United States' invasion of Venezuela does not pave the way for a Chinese "invasion" of Taiwan. However, it opens something perhaps more dangerous: the bargaining of a new Yalta, where the world is cut into pieces and shared across the table. The U.S. invasion of Venezuela and the arrest of President Maduro and his wife were as dramatic as last year’s B-2 bomber mission against Iranian nuclear facilities.
If these two events are seen as part of the same pattern, then Venezuela will not be placed under American occupation but will sink into internal chaos, while Trump quickly shifts his attention elsewhere—for instance, to Greenland.
Spectacle instead of governance
Trump is obsessed with dramatic effects and has no interest in examining what happens after the curtain falls, notes an analysis by Modern Diplomacy. Based on common logic, a "bloodless victory" in a military operation is merely temporary political fireworks; the real test is the governance that follows. From the precedents of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States ends up losing more than it gains—but this does not concern Trump. The current operation is even more impressive and even more hollow than those two real wars.
Although Trump differs from other American presidents in his rhetoric—he does not invoke "salvation from anti-democratic dictatorships" or anti-communism, but blames "narcoterrorism" and bluntly states his intention to control Venezuela's oil development—this sounds more sincere. From the perspective of international law, however, it is equally imperialistic behavior.
The "unwritten international legitimacy" of great powers
The problem is that Trump seems firmly convinced that the actions of great powers, when based on interests, constitute international law in themselves and no question of illegality arises. He also believes that the countries qualified to shape this "unwritten international legitimacy" alongside the United States are China and Russia.
From the perspective of great power politics, this action can be seen as Trump’s invitation to China and Russia to divide the world, aiming for the revival of a new Yalta Conference. After all, the United States recently published the 2025 "National Security Strategy," clearly heralding the piece of the cake they desire: the Western Hemisphere. As for the parts the United States is willing to "cede," these are up for negotiation—Beijing and Moscow can submit bids. Russia may be interested. But how does China, which Trump has upgraded to G2 status, view this invitation?
Chinese interests in Latin America
First and foremost, Beijing must evaluate its interests in Latin America. The Chinese presence in the region has skyrocketed since 2014, with investments—in the broad sense—now exceeding $600 billion, including but not limited to cooperation in the energy sector. Furthermore, Venezuela is one of China’s six "all-weather strategic partners."
The Latin American and Caribbean region is now a major hub of the "Belt and Road" Initiative. If China remains indifferent to current American actions or underestimates Trump’s ambition to control the region and exclude Chinese influence, its substantial interests and international reputation will suffer serious blows.
However, the game of "sharing the cake" is exactly that: no pain, no gain. Trump’s key bargaining chip is the American commitments to Taiwan—the Taiwan Relations Act—as well as the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. These three constitute the "contracts" concerning the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
Taiwan as bait
Trump can drop these three baits gradually, letting Beijing choose between vital and important interests. He likely believes that China will eventually recognize American sovereignty over the American continent in exchange for power in the Western Pacific. Xi Jinping will certainly not accept it uncritically, but he cannot deny that the temptation is large enough to be placed on the negotiating table.
What is certain is that Chinese decision-making has always been conservative and slow, and that China has a strategic ambition greater than just "sharing the cake": not to replace the United States, but to decouple the world from the global order and values dominated by the West for a century. This is a mindset incomprehensible to the West—how can you lead a new world without replacing the United States? In reality, not even China's 1.4 billion citizens fully understand this vision.
How can non-interventionism lead the world? Examples exist: Russia and Iran. If China were willing to intervene, the war in Ukraine would not last so long; similarly, Israel could hardly occupy Gaza under Chinese intervention, let alone overthrow the Iranian regime.
Waiting for the collapse of the West
The most logical explanation is that Beijing is waiting for the Western world to collapse on its own and then rebuild a global village on the ruins. In this process, China simply needs to strengthen itself, avoid exhausting its national power in wars, and eventually achieve its goal.
In other words, Beijing is in no hurry to share the cake with Washington because, although the United States is heading toward decline, it has not yet turned into ruins. Under these circumstances, the cost of sharing is excessively high and not worth it.
Military pressure around Taiwan
Taking Taiwan as an example, the sixth "military exercise around Taiwan" launched by Beijing late last year can be considered to have essentially completed all military preparations. Only the Ryukyu Islands to the right of Taiwan and the northern islands of the Philippines to the south have not yet experienced exercises of similar scale and intensity.
If the Japanese Prime Minister had visited the Yasukuni Shrine—which China strongly opposes—at the end of last year, the exercises this time would inevitably have included the Ryukyus. Perhaps Tokyo sensed this and that is why the visit to this taboo shrine did not happen. Furthermore, the Philippines has restrained its moves in the South China Sea; otherwise, the northern Batan islands would face threats of live-fire exercises.
Each successive exercise that tightens the noose around Taiwan represents progress in increasing Beijing’s bargaining chips, making it harder for Trump to demand an exorbitant price on the Taiwan issue. In fact, if Beijing desired it, Taiwan could be "swallowed" directly—not with Trump’s theatrical style, but with steady occupation and permanent, meticulous governance.
Once China achieves unification, the power and will of the United States to hold the Ryukyus and the South China Sea will be even lower. That is precisely when Beijing would be willing to share the cake, because the pricing would be entirely different. What it is considering today is simply what is less damaging to Chinese development: the cost of active unification or the price of passive exchange. This tests Trump’s calculations of profit and loss.
If Trump’s initial price for the "sale" of Taiwan is too high, Xi Jinping cannot accept it and will instead continue the confrontation with the United States on Latin American issues. Many observers believe that Latin America is too far from China and too close to the United States for Xi Jinping to gain an advantage.
However, the "rare earth crisis" is very close to the United States, as is the "antibiotic raw material crisis"—points that Bessent knows better than anyone. From this perspective, Trump’s "Taiwan sale price" must be calculated carefully; it is a long and complex deal. But as time passes, Taiwan will only continue to be devalued. If Trump hopes to achieve a substantial grand bargain during his term, he may need to make concessions beyond what he expects.
The risk of escalation
Of course, the United States could let Japan continue to provoke China on the Taiwan issue to prevent its devaluation—for example, by allowing Tokyo to abolish its pacifist constitution or even develop nuclear weapons. But the cost could be higher.
If Xi Jinping decides to take military action to prevent the recurrence of World War II-style events, this would inevitably involve U.S. forces in combat, appearing as a limited U.S.–China war aimed at American withdrawal. In a battle at the first island chain against Chinese forces, the American military has no chance of victory.
There is no sign that Washington has prepared a reasonable "Taiwan sale price" and offered it to Beijing in April. The Venezuela incident is enough to keep China and the United States busy with "strategic calculations" behind the scenes. In this respect, Trump’s flashy big moves seem to also aim at breaking the deadlock, pushing Beijing to agree soon to a meeting in April—otherwise, the issues on the negotiating table will pile up like a mountain.
The United States' invasion of Venezuela will not encourage China to "invade" Taiwan, because that is not Beijing’s style of operations. It will, however, accelerate China's progress in resolving the Taiwan issue—after all, Trump is becoming increasingly overt in signaling his intention to divide the cake.
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